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stage. Furthermore, since there are no more objects to be auctioned after the second,
the bidding behaviour of agents during the second auction is the same as that for a
single object auction. However, a bidder’s strategy for the ﬁrst auction depends on its
expected proﬁt from the object to be auctioned next. Thus, while a bidder’s strategy
for the second auction depends only on the others’ dropout levels, its strategy for the
ﬁrst auction depends not only the others’ drop out levels, but also on its own ex-ante
expected proﬁt from the second auction.
Considerthesecondauction. Equilibriumstrategiesforthisauction
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arethe sameas those giveninEquation5 exceptthat thenumberofbiddersnowis
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1
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instead of
￿ . Thus, the bidder with the highest surplus for the second auction wins it
and pays the second highest surplus (as per Equation 8 with
￿ replaced with
￿
1
￿ ).
We now turn to the ﬁrst auction. Although the bidders know the distribution (from
which the cost and value signals are drawn) before the ﬁrst auction begins, they draw
the signals for the second object only after the ﬁrst auction ends. Given this, each bid-
der’s (i.e., for
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￿ ) ex ante expected proﬁt for the second auction is obtained
from Equation 9 as follows:
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This is because each of the
￿
;
1
￿ agents that participate in the second auction have
ex ante identical chances of winning it. Note that the right hand side of Equation 11
does not depend on
￿ . In other words, since bidders receive their signals for the second
auction only after the ﬁrst auction, the expected proﬁt for the second (prior to the end
of the ﬁrst) is the same for all
￿ bidders.
Now consider a stage where
￿ bidders have dropped out of the ﬁrst auction at bid
levels
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￿ . Also, let
/ denote the price announced by the
auctioneer at this stage. If bidder
￿ makes a bid at
/ , and wins the auction, it gets a
proﬁt of:
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In other words, for the ﬁrst auction, each bidder discounts its surplus by its expected
proﬁt for the second auction. Thus, the
￿ -tuple of strategies
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￿ deﬁned in Equation 10, constitutes a symmetric equilibrium for the ﬁrst auction.
Note that in Equation 13, the ex ante expected proﬁt from the second auction (
￿
￿ )
is the same for all the bidders. As a result, the bidder with the highest surplus for the
ﬁrst auction wins it and pays the second highest surplus.
￿
7